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Kahkewistahaw First Nation v.
Taypotat: An Arbitrary Approach
to Discrimination
Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (“RCAP”) acknowledged
education as essential to both enhancing the lives of Aboriginal individuals
and achieving their collective goals.1 Education can improve the capacities
and talents of Aboriginal citizens to assume the responsibilities of operating
self-governing and community structures.2 In Kahkewistahaw First Nation v.
Taypotat,3 these 20-year-old conclusions were the focus of the first
paragraphs of both the factum of the Chief and Council of the
Kahkewistahaw First Nation4 and the unanimous judgment of the Supreme
Court of Canada.5
Education was also a key component of a more recent commission,
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (“TRC”). Its inquiry
into Canada’s residential schools confirmed that “the residential school
*
Professors, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary. The authors wish to thank Sonia
Lawrence and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
1
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 3, Gathering Strength
(Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 404 [hereinafter “Gathering Strength”]. See, in general,
Chapter 5.9 “Education for Self-Government”.
2
Id., at 501. For example, recommendation 2.3.36 in Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 326
[Restructuring the Relationship] provides that “[e]arly in the process of planning for selfgovernment agreements, whether in treaties or other agreements, provisions be drafted to
(a) recognize education and training as a vital component in the transition to Aboriginal government
and implement these activities well before self-government takes effect”.
3
[2015] S.C.J. No. 30, 2015 SCC 30, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 548 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] F.C.J.
No. 938 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Taypotat”].
4
Factum of the Appellants, Chief Sheldon Taypotat, Michael Bob, Janice McKay, Iris
Taypotat and Vera Wasacase as Chief and Council Representatives of the Kahkewistahaw First
Nation, online: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35518/FM010_Appellant_
Chief-Sheldon-Taypotat-et-al.pdf> [hereinafter “Factum of the Appellants”], at para. 1.
5
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 1.
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system was an education system for Aboriginal children in name only for
much of its existence.”6 Indeed, in their 2012 Interim Report, the TRC
concluded that “[r]esidential schools constituted an assault on selfgoverning and self-sustaining Aboriginal nations,”7 because “one of the
most far-reaching and devastating legacies of residential schools has
been their impact on the educational and economic success of Aboriginal
people”.8 The TRC’s finding that “the lowest levels of educational
success are in those communities with the highest percentages of
descendants of residential school Survivors: First Nations people living
on reserves, and Inuit” is significant for the issues in Taypotat.9 These
findings also illustrate that, for Aboriginal people, education cannot be
understood simply or necessarily as positive.
Is a minimum educational attainment level for Aboriginal citizens
seeking positions of leadership in their communities a barrier to
participation by already-disadvantaged individuals? Or is an educational
requirement a way to help both Aboriginal individuals and communities
achieve their goals? To put this in terms relevant to the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,10 should such an education requirement be seen as
discrimination contrary to the equality rights guarantee in section 15(1)?
Or should it be shielded from Charter scrutiny under section 25, which
requires Charter rights to be interpreted so as not to derogate from
Aboriginal, treaty or other rights? The former question — the equality

6
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for
the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada
(Winnipeg: TRC, 2015), at v, 3-4 [hereinafter “TRC Final Report”], online: <http://www.
trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Honouring_the_Truth_Reconciling_for_the_Future_July_23_
2015.pdf>.
7
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Interim Report (Winnipeg: TRC, 2012)
[hereinafter “TRC Interim Report”], online: <http://www.myrobust.com/websites/trcinstitution/
File/Interim%20report%20English%20electronic.pdf>. See also the historical document, Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Canada, Aboriginal Peoples, and Residential Schools: They
Came for the Children (Winnipeg: TRC, 2012), at 86 [hereinafter TRC, They Came for the Children]
(“The residential school system was intended to assimilate Aboriginal children into broader
Canadian society. With assimilation would come the breaking up of the reserves and the end of
treaty obligations. In this way the schools were part of a broader Canadian policy to undermine
Aboriginal leaders and Aboriginal self-government.”)
8
TRC Final Report, supra, note 6, at 145.
9
Id., at 146.
10
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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issue — was the exclusive focus of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Taypotat, and it will also be ours in this article.11
The community election code adopted by the Kahkewistahaw First
Nation in Saskatchewan to govern elections for the positions of Chief
and Band Councillor was at the centre of the controversy in Taypotat.12
The Kahkewistahaw Election Act restricted eligibility for these
leadership positions to persons who had at least a Grade 12 education or
an equivalent.13 As a result, and even though Louis Taypotat had
previously served as Chief for a total of 27 years between 1973 and
2007, he was disqualified from standing for election in May 2011
because he did not meet the new education minimum. Age 76 by the time
the case was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, Taypotat had
attended residential school until he was 14; his general educational
development had been subsequently assessed at a Grade 10 level.14
The Kahkewistahaw First Nation had spent 13 years developing their
new community election code. There were many drafts and many public
meetings with Band Council members, Elders and other First Nation
members. Both the draft Act and process leading up to it were controversial
within the community, in part because it was a community election code
and not a customary or traditional one.15 Several votes were needed in
2009 and 2010 to obtain a sufficient number of votes for ratification.16
The new election code took effect in February 2011.
In an application for judicial review, Taypotat challenged the
Kahkewistahaw Election Act’s educational requirement under section 15(1)
of the Charter. He was unsuccessful at the Federal Court level, but the

11
For analysis of the s. 25 issues raised by Taypotat, see Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette
Watson Hamilton, “Kahkewistahaw First Nation v. Taypotat — Whither Section 25 of the
Charter?”, forthcoming, Constitutional Forum.
12
Taypotat, supra, note 3.
13
Kahkewistahaw Election Act, enacted pursuant to the Order Amending the Indian Bands
Council Elections Order (Kahkewistahaw), SOR/2011-49, ss. 9.03, 10.01(d).
14
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 4.
15
Taypotat v. Kahkewistahaw First Nation, [2012] F.C.J. No. 1125, 2012 FC 1036, at para.
8 (F.C.T.D.), affd [2015] S.C.J. No. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taypotat FC”]; Taypotat v. Taypotat,
[2013] F.C.J. No. 938, 2013 FCA 192, at paras. 4-7 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Taypotat FCA”], revd
[2015] S.C.J. No. 30 (S.C.C.) (explaining that community election codes are governed by the Indian
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, while customary election rules rely on First Nations’ traditional norms
outside the Indian Act. For further discussion see Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal People,
First Nations Elections: The Choice Is Inherently Theirs (Ottawa: Canada Senate, May 2010), at 7).
16
Taypotat FCA, id., at paras. 3, 8-10. The ratification votes were an issue in the judicial
review before the Federal Court, who determined that the election code was adopted by the
necessary broad consensus: Taypotat FC, id., at para. 44.
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Federal Court of Appeal allowed his appeal. However, his win was
overturned in the Supreme Court of Canada. In a unanimous judgment
written by Abella J., without the benefit of arguments from interveners,
the Court held that Taypotat’s adverse effects discrimination claim was
not established by the evidence.
Because evidentiary deficiencies were the basis of the Court’s
judgment, the broader significance of Taypotat’s doctrinal developments
is difficult to predict. For the most part, Abella J. built upon her own
judgment in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., where she wrote the
majority decision on the section 15(1) issue.17 Although she relied on the
unanimous decision she co-authored with McLachlin C.J.C. in Withler v.
Canada (Attorney General)18 and their majority decision in R. v. Kapp19
to a much lesser extent, her judgment in Taypotat hints at an even greater
return to Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia20 than Kapp
claimed.21 The unanimous decision in Taypotat, following the multiple
judgments of the convoluted Quebec v. A., offers an opportunity to take
stock of the latest iteration of the analytical approach to a section 15(1)
claim,22 focusing as it did on issues related to grounds and the definition
of “discrimination”. As we will elaborate in Part II, the Court’s failure to
take an intersectional approach to grounds and the significant role of
arbitrariness in their understanding of discrimination operated to the
detriment of Taypotat’s claim. Justice Abella ultimately rested her

17
Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61
(S.C.C.), varg [2010] Q.J. No. 11091 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Quebec v. A.”]. On the issue of
whether excluding de facto spouses from provisions mandating property-sharing and spousal
support on the breakdown of marriages and civil unions violated the equality guarantee in s. 15(1)
of the Charter, Abella J. wrote the majority decision, with Deschamps J. (Cromwell and
Karakatsanis JJ., concurring) and McLachlin C.J.C. (writing only for herself) agreeing there was a
violation of s. 15(1). Justice LeBel (Fish, Rothstein, and Moldaver JJ., concurring) dissented on
s. 15(1), holding that there was no discrimination. On the issue of whether the violation was
justified under s. 1, McLachlin C.J.C. held that it was, thereby swinging the majority on the
outcome to a 5:4 decision that there was no unjustified discrimination.
18
[2011] S.C.J. No. 12, 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.), affg [2008] B.C.J. No.
2507 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Withler”].
19
[2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.), affg [2006] B.C.J. No.
1273 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Kapp”].
20
Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143
(S.C.C.), affg [1986] B.C.J. No. 338 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Andrews”].
21
Kapp, supra, note 19, at para. 14.
22
See Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “The Continual Reinvention of
Section 15 of the Charter” (2013) 64 U.N.B. L.J. 19 [hereinafter “Continual Reinvention”]
(reviewing the Supreme Court’s three different approaches to s. 15 between 1989 and its decision in
Quebec v. A., supra, note 17).
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decision on a number of evidentiary deficiencies, raising issues about the
ability of courts to take judicial notice of social context evidence and
whether statistical proof is needed to establish adverse effects, which we
also will examine in Part II.
Taypotat is one of eight Supreme Court of Canada section 15(1)
decisions in which an Aboriginal context was relevant to the claim.23 In
Taypotat, the Court emphasized the objectives behind the community’s
adoption of the Kahkewistahaw Election Act in finding that the
educational requirement was not discriminatory. This focus raises the
possibility that the educational requirement in Taypotat could have been
seen as a matter to be shielded from scrutiny under section 25. However,
section 25 was not argued before the Supreme Court, perhaps because
the Court has not provided any guidance on its interpretation since Kapp
in 2008.24 Although a consideration of the possible role of section 25 in
equality challenges is beyond the scope of this article, we conclude in
Part III that, until the Court articulates its approach to section 25 and its
relationship to section 15, equality rights analysis in the Aboriginal
context should be considered as distinct and used cautiously outside of
that context.

23
The other seven decisions are: Native Women’s Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 93, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.), revg [1992] F.C.J. No. 715 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter
“NWAC”] (government funding for an Aboriginal women’s group to allow participation in
constitutional talks); Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J.
No. 24, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.), varg [1996] F.C.J. 1486 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Corbiere”]
(voting restrictions on off-reserve band members); Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000]
1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.), affg [1997] O.J. No. 2213 (Ont. C.A.) (distribution of reserve-based casino
proceeds to Indian bands only); Kapp, supra, note 19 (priority to holders of Aboriginal fishing
licences); Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, 2009 SCC 9, [2009] 1
S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.), affg [2006] F.C.J. No. 1961 (F.C.A.) (Crown management of oil and gas
revenues for an Indian band); Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v.
Cunningham, [2011] S.C.J. No. 37, 2011 SCC 37, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.), revg [2009] A.J.
No. 678 (Alta. C.A.) (Métis Settlement membership rules); and R. v. Kokopenace, [2015] S.C.J.
No. 28, 2015 SCC 28, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 398 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] O.J. No. 2752 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Kokopenace”] (jury representativeness).
24
Kapp, supra, note 19, at paras. 62-65 (McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. (in obiter)) and
paras. 76ff. (Bastarache J., concurring). Section 15(2) of the Charter, the affirmative action
provision, was argued in Taypotat as a basis for shielding the Kahkewistahaw Election Act, supra,
note 13, although Abella J. did not deal with that argument: Factum of the Appellants, supra, note 4,
at paras. 102-116. The Federal Court of Appeal did refer to s. 25 in its judgment: Taypotat FCA,
supra, note 15, at paras. 41-42.
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II. DOCTRINAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES IN TAYPOTAT’S
APPROACH TO SECTION 15
1. Situating Taypotat
The test for determining a breach of section 15(1) of the Charter, based
in Andrews, was reformulated into the following two questions in 2008 in
Kapp: (1) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or
analogous ground? and (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?25 This formulation was confirmed
in 2011 in Withler,26 with the added explanation that a law perpetuates
disadvantage when it “treats a historically disadvantaged group in a way
that exacerbates the situation of the group”,27 a point developed later in
Quebec v. A. and Taypotat. In Quebec v. A., Abella J. acknowledged Kapp
and Withler’s restatement of the Andrews’ principles,28 and then backed
away from their focus on prejudice and stereotyping.29 She referred to
Kapp and Withler as “guides to a flexible and contextual inquiry” and
reformulated the inquiry as one into “whether a distinction has the effect of
perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage on the claimant because of his or her
membership in an enumerated or analogous group”.30 Taypotat continues
the shift from prejudice and stereotyping to historical disadvantage, but
also emphasizes “arbitrary disadvantage” as the focal point for step (2), as
we will discuss below.
The main issue in Taypotat related to step (1) and the question of
whether the Kahkewistahaw Election Act drew a distinction based on an
enumerated or analogous ground.31 In Corbiere, the majority of the
Supreme Court pointed out two reasons to limit equality claims to
enumerated or analogous grounds, both of which were quoted in
Taypotat. One reason was that those grounds “stand as constant markers
of suspect decision making or potential discrimination”, so that “we
should not speak of analogous grounds existing in one circumstance and

25
Kapp, supra, note 19, at para. 17. Kapp was the Court’s third attempt to specify the
analytical approach to s. 15; see “Continual Reinvention”, supra, note 22.
26
Withler, supra, note 18, at para. 30, quoting Kapp, supra, note 19, at para. 17.
27
Withler, supra, note 18, at para. 35.
28
Quebec v. A., supra, note 17, at para. 324.
29
Id., at paras. 325-30.
30
Id., at para. 331.
31
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 19.
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not another”.32 The second reason was that a reliance on grounds “helps
keep the focus on equality for groups that are disadvantaged in the larger
social and economic context”.33 Although Abella J. relied upon Corbiere
for these principles in Taypotat, she did not adopt Corbiere’s criteria for
identifying analogous grounds, namely, that they relate to “personal
characteristic[s] that [are] immutable or changeable only at unacceptable
cost to personal identity”, or that “the government has no legitimate
interest in expecting us to change to receive equal treatment under the
law.”34 As we will elaborate below, it is not clear what her method for
identifying analogous grounds was, perhaps because her main concern
was with the lack of evidence of disparate impact on any ground.
As we have already noted, the Court’s dismissal of Taypotat’s claim
rests primarily on evidentiary failings. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
articulated the importance of having sufficient facts to support a Charter
claim; facts are crucial to a contextual inquiry. As Cory J. put it in
MacKay v. Manitoba:
Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual
vacuum. To attempt to do so would trivialize the Charter and
inevitably result in ill-considered opinions. The presentation of facts is
not … a mere technicality; rather, it is essential to a proper
consideration of Charter issues. … Charter decisions cannot be based
upon the unsupported hypotheses of enthusiastic counsel. 35

It is well accepted that Charter claims may be proven by both
adjudicative facts and non-adjudicative facts. Adjudicative facts are those
that relate to the claimant and the events underpinning the claim, while
non-adjudicative facts include legislative facts — those that provide
broader context relating to the purpose of the law or government action —
and social facts — those that provide the background social, economic
32
Corbiere, supra, note 23, at para. 8 (McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.), quoted in Taypotat,
supra, note 3, at para. 19 (emphasis added). Justice L’Heureux-Dubé., in a concurring opinion,
rejected the idea that the recognition of an analogous ground (such as residence) in one case should
be determinative in future cases; Corbiere, supra, note 23, at para. 61.
33
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 19, quoting Lynn Smith & William Black, “The Equality
Rights” (2013) 62 S.C.L.R. (2d) 301, at 336. See also Corbiere, supra, note 23, at para. 11
(McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.).
34
Corbiere, id., at para. 13 (McLachlin and Bastarache JJ). For a critique of the majority’s
focus on immutability and an argument for L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s multi-variable approach to
analogous grounds, see Joshua Sealy-Harrington, “Assessing Analogous Grounds: The Doctrinal and
Normative Superiority of a Multi-Variable Approach” (2013) 10 J. L. & Equality 37.
35
MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at 361-62 (S.C.C.), affg
[1985] M.J. No. 164 (Man. C.A.), cited by Jamal Mahmud, “Legislative Facts in Charter Litigation:
Where Are We Now?” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 1, at 2.
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and cultural context for deciding the issues in the case.36 The Court
prefers to have social and legislative facts presented through the
testimony of expert witnesses in order to allow cross-examination on the
value and weight of such studies and reports and the research and
materials on which their opinions are based.37 However, they have also
acknowledged that expert evidence may be difficult for claimants to
marshal and “beyond the resources of the particular litigants”.38
Furthermore, the Court has continued to take judicial notice of social
context evidence in Charter cases without the need for experts, and even
at judges’ own behest, as recently as 2013 in Quebec v. A.39 The Court
has also recently clarified that appellate judges should be deferential to
findings of both adjudicative and non-adjudicative facts made at trial,
noting that “[t]he trial judge is charged with the responsibility of
establishing the record on which subsequent appeals are founded.”40
In the context of section 15, the Court has stated that adverse effects
discrimination cases such as Taypotat may be subjected to a higher
evidentiary burden.41 The Court’s unwillingness to take judicial notice,
and its insistence on proof of adverse effects discrimination specific to
the Kahkewistahaw First Nation both played a role in Taypotat, as we
will explain in the following sections.
2. Step 1: Grounds and Distinctions
Commenting on the decisions of the courts below, Abella J. focused
on arguments and holdings about whether the educational requirement
caused “a disparate impact on members of an enumerated or analogous
36
Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 92, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at
para. 27 (S.C.C.), affg [1987] O.J. No. 887 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Spence, [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, 2005
SCC 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458, at paras. 56-57 (S.C.C.), revg [2004] O.J. No. 4449 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Spence”].
37
Spence, id., at para. 68; see also Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72,
2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, at para. 53 (S.C.C.), varg [2012] O.J. No. 1296 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Bedford”], citing R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 2003 SCC 79,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at paras. 26-28 (S.C.C.), affg [2000] B.C.J. No. 1095 (B.C.C.A.).
38
Spence, supra, note 36, at para. 69, citing R. v. Koh, [1998] O.J. No. 5425, 42 O.R. (3d)
668 (Ont. C.A.) (noting the challenges claimants face in marshalling evidence of racial
discrimination).
39
Quebec v. A., supra, note 17, at para. 125 (LeBel J.) (referring to 2011 census data on the
prevalence of de facto couples in Canada and Quebec. Census data from 2006 had been entered at
trial by experts (id., para. 13)).
40
Bedford, supra, note 37, at para. 49.
41
Withler, supra, note 18, at para. 64.
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group”.42 In the past, this issue would have been stated as “whether the
distinction is made on the basis of an enumerated ground or a ground
analogous to it”.43 Is Abella J.’s use of “groups” rather than “grounds”
significant for identifying analogous grounds and undertaking an
intersectional analysis?44 It is difficult to answer that question because
she was not explicit about her reasons for referencing groups rather than
grounds and because the evidence was found to be lacking regardless of
the approach taken.
Justice Abella noted that, in Taypotat’s initial application, he argued
that the Grade 12 educational requirement violated section 15(1) because
“educational attainment is analogous to race and age”.45 The Federal Court
treated this as a straightforward claim that level of education is analogous
to one of the enumerated grounds, and rejected it for lack of evidence and
for not being a characteristic beyond an individual’s control.46 Justice
Abella, on the other hand, acknowledged that educational requirements
might create a discriminatory distinction, at least in the employment
context.47 There was no hint in her judgment that education was simply
a matter of individual choice. In Taypotat, Abella J. therefore appears
to continue restricting the relevancy of considerations of choice under
section 15(1), as she properly did in Quebec v. A.48
42
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 15. See also id., at paras. 16, 18, 21 and 22 for other uses
of “enumerated or analogous groups”.
43
Corbiere, supra, note 23, at para. 5.
44
For a review of the literature discussing whether a focus on “groups” is preferable to a
focus on “grounds”, see Jessica Eisen, “On Shaky Grounds: Poverty and Analogous Grounds under
the Charter” (2013) 2:2 Can. J. Poverty Law 1, at 26-31. See also Dianne Pothier, “Connecting
Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 C.J.W.L. 37 (arguing for
an intersectional approach to grounds and noting the importance of grounds for recognizing the
social and political realities associated with historical disadvantage).
45
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 10.
46
Taypotat FC, supra, note 15, at paras. 58-59. The inevitability of the immutability criteria
in Corbiere, supra, note 23, giving rise to corollary inquiries into claimants’ choices is discussed by
Eisen, supra, note 44, at 20.
47
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 23. Justice Abella discusses educational requirements
under step (2) of the Kapp analytical framework. She is not saying that the existence of the ground
might vary from case to case, but only that the determination of whether a distinction drawn on that
ground is discriminatory might change, which follows the majority understanding of grounds set out
in Corbiere, supra, note 23, at para. 9 (McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.).
48
Quebec v. A., supra, note 17, at paras. 334-43 (postponing consideration of “choice” of
relationship to s. 1). For critiques of choice-based reasoning in equality cases, see, e.g., Diana Majury,
“Women Are Themselves to Blame: Choice as a Justification for Unequal Treatment” in Fay Faraday,
Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive
Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), 209; Sonia Lawrence, “Choice, Equality and
Tales of Racial Discrimination: Reading the Supreme Court on Section 15”, in Sheila McIntyre &
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Taypotat did raise the disparate impact of the educational requirement
on older band members and residential school survivors in the Federal
Court, but that Court did not deal with this claim at any length.49 On
appeal, Taypotat framed his claim as one that “residential school
survivors without a Grade 12 education” were an analogous group under
section 15(1).50 Seeming to accept the lower court’s holding that education
was not an analogous ground, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the
educational requirement nonetheless created a distinction that resulted in
discrimination “on the enumerated ground of age, which [Taypotat] had
specifically raised, and with the analogous ground of Aboriginalityresidence recognized in Corbiere”.51
Justice Abella’s main concern was that the Federal Court of Appeal
raised the grounds for the section 15 claim on its own initiative. She was
particularly troubled that it did so for “residence on a reserve” because
Corbiere had only recognized “off-reserve residence” as an analogous
ground.52 It is true that McLachlin and Bastarache JJ., writing for the
majority in Corbiere, used the language of “Aboriginality-residence” and
attributed this language to L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s concurring judgment.53
However, L’Heureux-Dubé J. was very clear to limit the recognized
analogous ground to “off-reserve band member status”.54 The phrase
“Aboriginality-residence” does not appear in her judgment.55
If the relevant grounds had been framed by Taypotat to include
“residency on reserve”, the Court could have taken judicial notice that
First Nations persons living on reserve are a group characterized by
Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2006), at 115 [hereinafter “Diminishing Returns”].
49
Taypotat FC, supra, note 15, at paras. 54, 59.
50
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 12.
51
Taypotat FCA, supra, note 15, at para. 45.
52
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 26, citing Corbiere, supra, note 23, at paras. 6, 62
(emphasis in original).
53
Corbiere, id., at para. 14. Justices McLachlin and Bastarache earlier stated that they
agreed with L’Heureux‑Dubé J. that “Aboriginality-residence (off-reserve band member status)”
was an analogous ground of discrimination: id., at para. 6. Although McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.
sometimes used “Aboriginality-residence” without the “off-reserve” modifier (id., at para. 10), they
sometimes treated the two as synonyms, as when they referred to “the analogous ground of offreserve status or Aboriginality-residence” (id., at para. 16) and, in analyzing whether discrimination
existed, referred only to off-reserve band members (id., at paras. 18-19).
54
Id., at para. 62. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also described band members living off-reserve
as forming “part of a ‘discrete and insular minority’ defined by both race and residence” (id., at para. 71),
noting also that many of the affected persons in this group are women (id., at para. 86, citing a range
of social context evidence).
55
Id., at paras. 69, 72.
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constructively immutable personal traits that the state has no legitimate
expectation in changing. The majority recognized in Corbiere that
Aboriginal band members must make “profound decisions … to live on
or off their reserves, assuming choice is possible”.56 Similar to the social
context evidence relied on in Corbiere to support off-reserve residence as
an analogous ground,57 there is evidence the Court could have relied on
in Taypotat that establishes the constructive immutability of living on
reserve, including the work of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples that Abella J. took judicial notice of in her introductory
remarks.58 Louis Taypotat also introduced social context evidence that
could have been used to support the historical disadvantage associated
with on-reserve residency,59 one of the factors relevant to whether this
status should be recognized as an analogous ground.60
What of the ground that seems to have disappeared in the Supreme
Court’s ruling — status as a residential school survivor? The Supreme Court
also could have taken judicial notice that this ground relates to a discrete and
insular minority that has suffered historical disadvantage, by relying on the
RCAP Report61 and the Federal Government’s 2008 Statement of Apology
to former students of residential schools.62 The work of the TRC on the
impact of residential schools, in terms of both number of persons affected
and the consequences for education, could also have been noted.63
In earlier section 15(1) cases, the Court was prepared to take judicial
notice of the constructive immutability and historical disadvantage
related to new analogous grounds such as sexual orientation and marital
56

Id., at para. 15 (emphasis added).
Id., at paras. 62, 71, citing Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 4,
Perspectives and Realities (Ottawa: The Commission, 1996), at 519.
58
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, People to People, Nation to Nation:
Highlights from the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: The
Commission, 1996) [hereinafter “People to People, Nation to Nation”].
59
Taypotat FCA, supra, note 15, at para. 48.
60
Corbiere, supra, note 23, at para. 13 (McLachlin and Bastarache JJ).
61
People to People, Nation to Nation, supra, note 58 (noting the colonial and racist
rationale behind residential schools and the impact on survivors).
62
The apology was considered in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada
v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), [2016]
C.H.R.D. No. 2, 2016 C.H.R.T. 2, at para. 411, citing Government of Canada, Statement of Apology
to former students of Indian Residential Schools (June 11, 2008), online: <https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015644/1100100015649>. There was also expert evidence introduced in
this case on the history of residential schools and their impacts on individuals and communities.
63
Although the TRC’s final report was released in December 2015, following Taypotat, the
work of the TRC was well underway at the time of the Court’s decision and could have been the
basis of judicial notice. See TRC Final Report, supra, note 6; TRC Interim Report, supra, note 7;
TRC, They Came for the Children, supra, note 7.
57
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status.64 It is difficult to understand the basis of the Court’s reticence to
do so in Taypotat, in part because Abella J. did not articulate any criteria
for recognizing analogous grounds (or “groups”).
In spite of Abella J.’s focus on the failure of the claim at the
grounds/groups stage, she did go on to deal with the second part of step (1)
of the test for discrimination, namely whether the educational requirement
created a distinction:
While facially neutral qualifications like education requirements may
well be a proxy for, or mask, a discriminatory impact, this case falls not
on the existence of the requirement, but on the absence of any evidence
linking the requirement to a disparate impact on members of an
enumerated or analogous group.65

There are at least two difficulties with this passage. First, the idea that
the education requirements may “mask … a discriminatory impact” is
odd. In adverse effects discrimination cases, it is the distinction between
groups that is masked by facially neutral provisions and the differential
impact that reveals the discrimination.66
Second, it is not clear which “enumerated or analogous group” Abella J.
was dealing with when she stated that “educational requirements for
employment” may have discriminatory impacts in some circumstances.67
The Court’s comparisons — never explicitly drawn, but implicit in the
evidence and central to discerning disparate impact — must have been
64
See, e.g., Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at 528 (S.C.C.),
affg [1993] F.C.J. 401 (F.C.A.) (La Forest J., dissenting but not on this point, recognizing sexual
orientation as an analogous ground without any reference to evidence); Miron v. Trudel, [1995]
S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, at para. 152 (S.C.C.), revg [1991] O.J. No. 1553 (Ont. C.A.)
(McLachlin J., recognizing marital status as an analogous ground without any reference to evidence).
There are other cases where the Court has ignored social context evidence at the grounds stage,
however. See, e.g., Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, 2011 SCC 20,
[2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), revg [2008] O.J. No. 4543 (Ont. C.A.) (declining to recognize
occupational status as a farmworker as an analogous ground in spite of the evidence) and Fay
Faraday, “Envisioning Equality: Analogous Grounds and Farm Workers’ Experience of
Discrimination” in Fay Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds., Constitutional Labour Rights in
Canada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 113-14.
65
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 15.
66
Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Adverse Impact: The Supreme Court’s
Approach to Adverse Effects Discrimination under Section 15 of the Charter” (2014) 19 Rev. Const.
Stud. 191, at 196-97 [hereinafter “Adverse Impact”].
67
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 23. It is unclear whether the Court was equating
eligibility to stand for election as Chief of a First Nation with eligibility for a job. The analogy may
have been triggered by the Appellant’s argument that the educational requirement was a “bona fide
occupational requirement for holding elected office”: Factum of the Appellant, supra, note 4, at
paras. 74-82.
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between Taypotat and community members who are younger, who live
off-reserve or who have both characteristics. Comparisons involving
residential school survivors — a category of persons overlapping with
elder band members living on the reserve — were not made, consistent
with the Court’s more general disregard of this possible ground in
Taypotat. Additionally, the fact that no comparator group was identified
and no comparisons were expressly made raises questions about the
wisdom of conflating grounds and comparator groups into a discussion
of “enumerated or analogous groups”. Even though the role of comparative
analysis was made less formalistic in Withler,68 comparisons may still be
useful in establishing the differential treatment or impact that is key to
finding a violation of section 15(1), especially in claims of adverse
effects discrimination.
Turning to the implicit comparisons, the Court found no evidence that
the education requirement in the Kahkewistahaw Election Act drew a
distinction, or adversely impacted older community members, community
members resident on the reserve, or those who have both characteristics.69
The difficulty with this finding is the specificity of evidence that the
Court seems to require, i.e., statistical evidence to prove adverse effects
on the grounds in question in the context of this particular First Nation
community.70 Justice Abella did not accept the evidence relied on by the
Federal Court of Appeal, introduced by Taypotat, which was specific to
Saskatchewan First Nations but only for those 20-24 years old.71 The
Federal Court of Appeal supplemented that evidence by taking judicial
notice of the underlying 2006 census data on which it was based,
showing more generalized Canadian statistical trends relating to
education level, age and on-reserve status.72 Yet Abella J. found that this

68
In Withler, supra, note 18, the Court reduced what had been a focus on “mirror
comparator groups”, while noting comparison still has a role to play throughout a s. 15(1) analysis.
It noted that at step (1), a comparative approach helps determine whether there is a distinction
between the claimant and others based on a protected ground: id., at paras. 62-63. See also Jennifer
Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality after Withler”
(2011) 16 Rev. Const. Stud. 31, at 45-46.
69
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 24.
70
Id., at paras. 27, 31.
71
See John Richards, “Closing the Aboriginal / non-Aboriginal Education Gaps”, C.D. Howe
Institute, Backgrounder No. 116 (October 2008), at 4; cited in Taypotat FCA, supra, note 15, at para. 48
(indicating high school completion rates of 39 per cent for on-reserve, and over 65 per cent for
off-reserve Aboriginal persons in Saskatchewan aged 20-24 in 2006).
72
Taypotat FCA, supra, note 15, at para. 52, citing Statistics Canada, Educational Portrait
of Canada, 2006 Census (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2008), at 10 (Catalogue number 97-560).

256

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

evidence was insufficient to establish a distinction based on residency on
reserve, age, or both grounds.
With regard to residence, she indicated that she had “serious doubts”
about whether the educational requirement could have a disadvantageous
effect on members of the First Nation based on their residence on the
reserve.73 She noted that the Chief was required to reside on the reserve
under the terms of the Kahkewistahaw Election Act, and that this
fostered, rather than excluded, participation in governance by those
living on-reserve.74 This analysis illustrates a problem with considering
residence on- and off-reserve in isolation from age and/or residential
school survivorship. This siloed approach does not get at the disparate
impact at issue in this case.75
The Court next considered, separately and independently, the ground
of age and whether the educational requirement had a disadvantageous
impact on older First Nations members. Here the problem was entirely
evidential; Abella J. showed a reluctance to generalize national trends
about age and education to a specific First Nation or to a subset of that
First Nation living on reserve.76
Finally, Abella J. considered Taypotat’s argument that the educational
requirement discriminated against “older community members who live
on a reserve.”77 However, nothing is said about this group except that
there was no evidence to support the argument.78
What is not explained is why the Court failed to connect either age,
residence on reserve or both with the status of being a residential school
survivor, even though the disproportionate impact of the educational
requirement on residential school survivors was raised in the initial
judicial review,79 and argued before the Supreme Court.80
The Court’s failure to grapple with the demands of an intersectional
analysis in Taypotat is troubling. If the Court had been prepared to
consider the grounds of age, on-reserve status and residential school
73

Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 28.
Id.
75
It also shows the problems with considering arbitrariness under s. 15(1), as we will
elaborate on in the next section.
76
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 31.
77
Id., at para. 33 (emphasis in original).
78
Id.
79
Taypotat FC, supra, note 15, at para. 54.
80
Factum of the Respondent, Louis Taypotat, online: Supreme Court of Canada,
online: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35518/FM020_Respondent_LouisTaypotat. pdf>, at paras. 46, 48 (emphasis added).
74
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survivorship intersectionally, it could have relied on the census data and
the TRC’s historical documents describing the consequences of residential
schools to show the adverse impact of an education requirement on older
residential school survivors living on reserves in Saskatchewan.
It is possible that by insisting on more specific statistical evidence,
Abella J. was signalling the importance of recognizing the diversity of
Aboriginal peoples in Canada, such that generalizations should not be
made from one First Nation to the next (let alone from First Nations to
other Aboriginal groups). The C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder introduced
by Taypotat and relied on by the Federal Court of Appeal indicates that
Aboriginal education outcomes “differ markedly across the three identity
population groups” (First Nation, Métis and Inuit).81 However, because
census data is based on provincial populations, the claimant would bear
the burden in this kind of case to produce evidence about education
levels within their own on-reserve community based on age or residential
school survivor status, as well as relevant comparator evidence for offreserve Aboriginal persons, perhaps from the same nation. This would be
extremely challenging, especially if small communities such as the
Kahkewistahaw First Nation do not gather that type of evidence
themselves, leaving it to the individual claimant to do so.
The demand in Taypotat for community-specific evidence also seems at
odds with Corbiere, where the Court emphasized the importance of
considering the issues beyond the particular circumstances of the
Batchewana Band, even though the claim had been framed to focus on the
section 15 rights of non-resident members of that Band.82 However,
Corbiere engaged the much broader issue of direct discrimination against
off-reserve members of all Bands in elections under the Indian Act, rather
than consideration of the adverse effects of a specific Band’s election
code.83
Justice Abella did acknowledge in Taypotat that education
requirements could have an adverse impact based on grounds such as
race in some circumstances, relying on the American human rights case
of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.84 In Griggs, the U.S. Supreme Court was
81

C.D. Howe Institute, Backgrounder No. 116, supra, note 71, at 3; Taypotat, supra, note 3,

at para. 32.
82

Corbiere, supra, note 23, at paras. 45-50.
The Appellants also distinguished the use of judicial notice in Quebec v. A. on this basis,
noting that case involved legislation that covered the whole province, which was the scope of the
statistics used by LeBel J. See Factum of the Appellants, supra, note 4, at para. 87.
84
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 23, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(striking down an employment requirement of a high school diploma or mastery of intelligence tests).
83
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prepared to rely on a much more generalized evidentiary context than our
Supreme Court was prepared to do in Taypotat.85 Again, this could be
explained by the importance of recognizing diversity amongst Aboriginal
groups in Canada, which Abella J. did advert to in Taypotat.86
3. Step 2: Discrimination
Although the focus of Abella J.’s reasons was the lack of evidence
linking the educational requirement in the election code to a disparate
impact on an enumerated or analogous group, she made some broader
points about matters that would previously have fallen under Kapp’s
second step: “whether the distinction creates a disadvantage by perpetuating
prejudice or stereotyping?”87
Perhaps most importantly, Abella J. continued to downplay the need
for a claimant to prove prejudice or stereotyping, consistent with her
judgment in Quebec v. A. Indeed, there is no mention at all of either
prejudice or stereotyping in Taypotat.88 Despite the fact that prejudice
and stereotyping were the focus of the four judges who dissented
on section 15 in Quebec v. A., the Supreme Court is now apparently
unanimous that the appropriate question is whether the distinction “has
the effect of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage”.89
Although we had hoped that Abella J. misspoke when she referred
to “arbitrary disadvantage” once in Quebec v. A.,90 this term prevailed
in Taypotat, appearing six times in the test for recognizing discriminatory
distinctions.91 Justice Abella used “arbitrary” as a synonym for
“discriminatory”,92 but did not indicate why she thinks this particular
The Court in Taypotat failed to note that caution should be used in analogizing to a case decided in a
very different doctrinal context, involving a human rights claim against a private employer.
85
Griggs, id., at note 6 (relying on statistical evidence of the impact of the education
requirement on African Americans in North Carolina, based on census data from that state).
86
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 32. It should also be noted that Griggs took place within
a particular socio-political context of race relations in the American south.
87
Kapp, supra, note 19, at para. 17.
88
The Federal Court of Appeal found discrimination based on the perpetuation of prejudice
and stereotyping. See Taypotat FCA, supra, note 15, at paras. 56-59.
89
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at paras. 16, 18, 28 and 34 (emphasis added).
90
Quebec v. A., supra, note 17, at para. 331. See also McCormick v. Fasken Martineau
DuMoulin LLP, [2014] S.C.J. No. 39, 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 108 (S.C.C.), affg [2012]
B.C.J. No. 1508 (B.C.C.A.), a human rights case where Abella J. uses the language of arbitrary
discrimination. More generally, see Jennifer Koshan, “Under the Influence: Discrimination Under
Human Rights Legislation and Section 15 of the Charter” (2014) 3:1 Can. J. Human Rights 115.
91
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at paras. 16, 18, 20, 28 (twice) and 34.
92
Id., at para. 20.
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word is one that sheds light on identifying which laws violate section 15(1).
The most common understanding of “arbitrary” is “not based on reason
or evidence”.93 To ask whether an impugned provision is “based on
reason or evidence” is to import section 1 justifications about purposes
and means — not impact — into section 15. Interestingly, in Kokopenace,
decided just before Taypotat, the dissenting justices noted that in
Quebec v. A., Abella J. “rejected an approach which would internally
limit equality rights by looking at the reasonableness of state action,
concluding that this was a matter best left for the justification analysis
under s. 1 of the Charter.”94 Kokopenace’s interpretation of Quebec v. A.
supports a reading that Taypotat moves away from that analytical
separation by focusing on arbitrariness. Furthermore, arbitrariness has a
significant meaning in section 7 jurisprudence under the principles of
fundamental justice, and injecting it into the section 15 analytical
framework deprives section 15 of distinctiveness under the Charter.95
The Court also returned to two of the four contextual factors developed
in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) as relevant
to whether an impugned law is discriminatory in the sense that it results in
arbitrary disadvantage.96 First, a law that perpetuates arbitrary
disadvantage is one that fails to respond to group members’ “actual
capacities and needs”.97 In Law, this was the second contextual factor,
the correspondence factor, which was the subject of much criticism
because it required a focus on government objectives and their link to a
group’s characteristics.98 This focus also improperly shifts the burden to

93

Merriam-Webster, online: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arbitrary>.
Kokopenace, supra, note 23, at para. 252 (Cromwell J. and McLachlin C.J.C.,
dissenting), citing Quebec v. A., supra, note 17, at para. 333. Justice Abella did not sit on
Kokopenace, which involved the issue of whether the exclusion of on-reserve residents on a jury roll
violated s. 11(d), 11(f) or 15(1) of the Charter. The s. 15(1) claim was dismissed summarily by the
majority (at paras. 128 and 139), and was not addressed by the dissent (at para. 201).
95
See Jennifer Koshan, “Redressing the Harms of Government (In)Action: A Section 7
Versus Section 15 Charter Showdown” (2013) 22:1 Const. Forum 31; Sheilah Martin, “Balancing
Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, at 329-30.
96
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 88 (S.C.C.), affg [1996] F.C.J. No. 511 (F.C.A.). Law’s contextual factors
were also approved in Kapp, supra, note 19, at para. 23, where they were tied to prejudice and
stereotyping.
97
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 20.
98
See, e.g., Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals”, supra, note
95, at 328; Sheila McIntyre, “Deference and Dominance: Equality Without Substance” in
Diminishing Returns, supra, note 48, at 102-105; Beverley Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting
Equality” (2000) 11 Const. Forum 65, at 72.
94

260

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

the claimant to prove the arbitrariness of government action rather than
requiring the government to prove the rationality of its actions.
The other factor that plays a role in Taypotat’s understanding of
discrimination is Law’s first contextual factor, focused on “pre-existing
disadvantage”. This factor requires a search for “constant markers of
suspect decision making”99 and asks whether the distinction “imposes
burdens or denies a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing,
perpetuating or exacerbating their disadvantage”100 or “widens the gap
between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society
rather than narrowing it”.101 Justice Abella reiterated the point from
Withler that “evidence that goes to establishing a claimant’s historical
position of disadvantage” will be relevant.102 It thus appears that the
Court is coming closer to requiring the law’s “perpetuation” of an
historical disadvantage before discrimination can be found.103
The Court’s statements about the overall approach to discrimination,
with their broad focus on context, systemic disadvantage and the effects
of government actions, are more promising than is the repeated use of
“arbitrary disadvantage”. Nevertheless, arbitrariness seemed to be the
focus when considering the sufficiency of the evidence in establishing
discrimination.104
The Court suggested that an educational requirement was an
important qualification for leaders governing Aboriginal communities.
They emphasized that the Kahkewistahaw Election Act was that First
Nation’s response to the RCAP Report and its identification of education
as a top priority for self-governing communities.105 While we do not
dispute the merits of these assertions, we do maintain that they are
relevant to a section 1 justification of the educational requirement — or,
99

Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 19, quoting Corbiere, supra, note 23, at para. 8.
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 20 (emphasis added).
101
Id., quoting Quebec v. A., supra, note 17, at para. 332.
102
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 21, quoting Withler, supra, note 18, at para. 38 and
Quebec v. A., supra, note 17, at para. 327.
103
The question of whether s. 15(1) claimants must show pre-existing disadvantage dates
back to R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at para. 45 (S.C.C.), affg [1987]
O.J. No. 767 (Ont. C.A.), where Wilson J. held that “in most but perhaps not all cases” only
historically disadvantaged groups can be discriminated against. In R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990]
S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, at para. 77 (S.C.C.), revg [1988] O.J. No. 95 (Ont. C.A.);
revg [1989] M.J. No. 127 (Man. C.A.), McLachlin J., writing for those dissenting on the s. 15(1)
issue, recognized that Turpin seemed to require a court to “look for a disadvantage peculiar to the
‘discrete and insular minority’ discriminated against, to determine if it suffers disadvantage apart
from and independent of the particular legal distinction being challenged” (quoting Turpin, id., at para. 45).
104
Taypotat, supra, note 3, at para. 34.
105
Id., at para. 1, quoting Gathering Strength, supra, note 1, at 433 and 540-41.
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alternatively, a consideration of section 25 of the Charter — and not to
whether the requirement violates section 15(1).
What might be the underlying reasons why the Court did not find the
discrimination arguments in Taypotat persuasive, beyond its stated
reasons based on the lack of evidence? Two distinguishing features make
Taypotat stand out amongst the other equality cases involving Aboriginal
claimants.106 First, it is the only adverse effects discrimination case in the
group.107 Second, it is the only case involving a First Nation respondent
and consideration of a direct conflict between an Aboriginal person and
(part of) his community.108 This type of claim is one that we suggest may
be better handled by the articulation of an approach to section 25 and its
relationship with section 15.109

III. CONCLUSION
It is understandable that the Supreme Court in Taypotat was
concerned with the objectives underlying the election code’s education
requirement and was loathe to burden the Kahkewistahaw First Nation
with justification of this requirement. However, by emphasizing an
arbitrariness element in the test for section 15(1), rather than focusing on
community goals and the First Nation’s rights under section 25 or section 1,
the Court may have made it more difficult for other equality rights
claimants outside the Aboriginal rights context. Similarly, by incorporating
stringent evidentiary requirements into section 15(1), even if motivated
in part by the need to recognize the diversity of Aboriginal peoples, the
Court may also be making claims more challenging for equality rights
claimants in other contexts.
It is true that the Court’s decision continues the welcome new
direction begun in Quebec v. A., which saw the broadening of
discrimination beyond stereotyping and prejudice and the restriction of
considerations of choice under section 15(1). However, in addition to
106

For a description of these cases see, supra, note 23.
For a discussion of the challenges of adverse effects discrimination claims that Taypotat
may be illustrative of, see “Adverse Impact”, supra, note 66, at 226-31.
108
Other s. 15 cases have also involved elements of such conflicts, but more indirectly. For
example, in NWAC, supra, note 23, NWAC sought to participate in the consultation process for
constitutional reforms in the early 1990s, arguing that the Aboriginal groups who were being
formally consulted were male-dominated and would not advocate strongly for the Charter’s
application to Aboriginal governments.
109
For further discussion see “Kahkewistahaw First Nation v. Taypotat — Whither Section 25
of the Charter?”, supra, note 11.
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their problematic reliance on arbitrariness and burdensome evidentiary
requirements, the Court’s failure to undertake any intersectionality
analysis is also a disappointing feature of Taypotat. The decision appears
to be results-oriented and reactive. Indeed, although Taypotat is a
unanimous judgment, it raises almost as many questions about how to
conduct a section 15(1) challenge as it answers.

